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uring the late fall of each year Canadian governments publish their
public accounts — the audited documents that show how much they
raised and spent in the previous fiscal year. It is also when
governments gear up for their spring budgets — the documents that
lay out before legislatures how much they intend to raise and spend in the coming
fiscal year. In evaluating governments’ plans for the year to come, it might seem
natural to ask how reliable previous years’ plans were as indicators of what
actually happened. Yet Canadians rarely monitor how effective governments have
been in hitting the revenue and spending targets that legislators voted for the
previous spring.
Control over public money is at the heart of our parliamentary democracy. The
budget process is a critical part of government accountability to legislatures, and
legislators’ ultimate accountability to voters. The public has a right — it is not too
much to say an obligation — to compare what legislators voted for with what
governments actually did. Without rewards and punishments for governments’
success and failure in adhering to fiscal promises, a key link in the accountability
process is missing.
The C.D. Howe Institute’s fiscal accountability measures help to fill that gap.
They compare federal and provincial/territorial budget projections with actual
results. They allow all to see which governments have been best, and which worst,
in achieving their targets. One measure assesses bias, or whether deviations
between projections and results show a tendency toward either over- or
undershooting. Another measures accuracy, or the degree of deviation between
results and projections, regardless of direction.
The C.D. Howe findings for the past decade indicate that elected
representatives and Canadians generally need to do more to ensure that
governments actually do what they vote to do every spring. The glum if not
surprising result of this investigation is that governments tend to spend more than
they promise at budget time.
Some do better than others: Quebec’s results over the past decade are striking
for their relatively small tendency toward overruns and their generally good
accuracy. Alberta and Saskatchewan, by contrast, have tended to overshoot their
spending targets by a wide margin. The revenues of these two provinces are
strongly influenced by fluctuating natural-resource prices and, as a result, they
have particular difficulty in controlling spending. A similar tendency appears to
afflict provinces and territories with a pronounced dependency on federal transfer
payments. Finally, the results indicate a tendency for spending overruns and
undershoots to be positively correlated with revenue surprises.
On a more positive note, however, governments did better at keeping their
fiscal promises during the past five years. This improvement underlines what the
variation in performance among governments also makes clear: that poor fiscal
accountability is a fixable problem. Canadians should accept nothing less than
conscientious delivery of budget promises. Better performance in this regard
should be a key fiscal priority in 2008 and beyond.
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data.Measuring Fiscal Results against Budget Commitments
Scrutiny of governments’ fiscal performance tends to focus on the bottom line:
how large the surplus or deficit is that budgets project, or public accounts reveal.
While the bottom line is important, so are the different forces that affect revenue
and spending. An informative evaluation of fiscal performance, therefore, needs to
scrutinize revenue and spending separately.
In an exercise that measures and seeks to improve accountability, moreover,
pride of place goes to the investigation of spending. Governments that rely more
on resource revenues, or federal government transfers such as equalization
payments, will naturally have a harder time predicting their revenues. Fairness in
comparisons aside, a focus on spending has two other compelling justifications.
Spending is what drives governments’ claim on the economy’s resources: every
dollar spent must be raised in taxes, or reflected in greater borrowing or less debt
repayment. In addition, while governments may set tax rates and other revenue
parameters, they vote spending in dollar terms — and both elected representatives
and voters are entitled to expect those votes to mean something. 
The highlight of the results is the difference between announced and actual
changes in spending. The “announced spending change” is a budget document
dollar number: the difference between the total spending projected for the coming
fiscal year and the spending during the previous year shown in the same
document. The “actual spending change” is a public-accounts number: the
difference between the total spending in the most recent fiscal year and the
spending for the previous year in the same document.
1 To produce more
meaningful comparisons among Canada’s governments of different sizes, we scale
the differences in percentage terms, using the previous year’s budgeted figures as
the base.
Table 1 shows the annual results for actual and announced spending for
Ottawa and the provinces since the 1997/98 fiscal year. The top panel shows
projected changes in spending in each budget. The middle panel shows actual
changes in spending in the public accounts. The bottom panel shows the
difference between the two.
Not surprisingly, the considerable variations from government to government
and year to year make discerning patterns from the raw numbers in the table a
challenge. So we turn to two useful descriptive statistics of success or failure in
hitting budget targets:
￿ Bias. The statistical bias of a forecast is its tendency, if any, to err
consistently in one direction. We show the mean error over the 10 years, a
simple and widely used measure in which undershoots and overshoots can
offset each other. Though useful, the mean suppresses some information. A
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1 This method reduces the impact of two problems that can affect comparisons of spending and
revenue levels in the public accounts with levels in budgets. Sometimes in-year accounting
changes will distort comparisons between the different documents: using changes as reported in
the public accounts and in the budget should eliminate that problem. A more serious problem
historically was the use of different accounting methods for public accounts than for budgets.
Comparing changes rather than levels typically reduces the significance of those discrepancies.
See Adrian, Guillemette and Robson (2007) for more discussion of this method.C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 3
Federal Nfld. P.E.I. NS NB Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. NWT YK Nunavut
Announced Spending Change (%)
1997/98 -1.75 -2.72 -3.86 -0.24 - 1.51 -0.61 -4.03 -1.41 -1.24 1.24 -0.64 -4.11
1998/99 0.34 0.41 -2.21 -0.51 -0.47 1.75 -0.61 0.99 1.99 0.47 0.77 -7.39
1999/00 0.13 -1.02 -0.29 4.57 2.06 -1.20 2.94 1.79 -0.33 2.16 1.33 -3.63
2000/01 0.64 3.11 1.51 -0.61 -2.25 2.75 -1.23 -0.62 3.63 1.78 -1.30 4.84 -1.88 3.20
2001/02 5.14 5.35 -0.22 0.51 6.60 3.40 2.15 1.72 5.85 12.48 7.43 4.47 -1.12 1.79
2002/03 3.35 1.45 1.31 0.89 4.43 2.02 3.47 2.20 -0.77 -8.05 -0.32 5.08 -4.42 1.96
2003/04 2.79 5.53 4.69 3.78 4.31 4.26 7.07 4.15 3.41 0.21 -2.37 5.68 -6.85 3.20
2004/05 2.29 0.42 -3.64 4.94 2.29 3.09 6.88 1.10 0.90 2.90 -2.59 2.67 5.14 -6.51
2005/06 1.87 5.48 1.41 4.15 3.15 3.34 4.18 3.50 1.14 5.68 4.74 1.51 5.04 -2.30
2006/07 5.03 10.11 2.62 6.25 1.67 4.10 2.08 3.39 0.13 3.99 3.68 0.84 -3.10 2.59
2007/08 4.62 17.12 7.97 5.06 2.85 3.95 2.61 5.81 1.56 11.72 3.87 4.67 -0.58 2.80
Actual Spending Change (%)
1997/98 0.12 8.49 -0.77 4.00 0.91 1.04 0.17 5.25 0.61 6.06 -0.52 -0.85
1998/99 3.79 -5.33 4.26 3.53 5.47 5.91 2.28 3.60 8.73 4.25 1.08 4.62
1999/00 0.74 -3.42 6.07 6.19 3.83 1.86 7.10 9.41 3.56 10.00 7.77 3.82
2000/01 5.98 6.39 10.66 0.22 -2.25 4.88 -0.50 2.76 2.55 9.47 1.11 6.04 4.10 10.66
2001/02 2.08 5.50 3.78 5.09 7.35 3.18 2.97 1.84 7.00 9.88 10.11 9.23 5.54 8.39
2002/03 4.02 5.86 2.28 1.45 4.22 -0.76 4.13 3.05 0.57 -1.52 1.06 5.69 3.04 5.10
2003/04 3.53 5.13 12.63 6.62 3.93 2.10 7.75 7.13 6.15 5.89 1.10 5.75 8.97 7.10
2004/05 11.48 0.81 0.29 7.91 2.00 4.86 7.40 2.65 3.87 11.11 1.44 5.57 10.68 2.86
2005/06 -0.78 4.86 1.76 6.13 5.85 2.98 5.65 7.24 9.21 11.61 7.16 7.35 1.61 9.92
2006/07 6.21 5.00 3.30 4.57 5.31 4.72 4.92 5.35 7.38 9.09 4.78 4.32 6.71 14.39
2007/08
Difference (%)
1997/98 1.86 11.21 3.09 4.25 2.42 1.65 4.21 6.67 1.85 4.82 0.11 3.27
1998/99 3.45 -5.74 6.48 4.03 5.95 4.15 2.88 2.61 6.74 3.78 0.31 12.01
1999/00 0.61 -2.40 6.36 1.62 1.78 3.06 4.16 7.62 3.89 7.83 6.43 7.45
2000/01 5.35 3.28 9.16 0.83 0.00 2.13 0.73 3.39 -1.08 7.68 2.41 1.20 5.97 7.46
2001/02 -3.06 0.15 4.00 4.58 0.75 -0.22 0.82 0.12 1.16 -2.60 2.68 4.76 6.66 6.60
2002/03 0.67 4.41 0.97 0.56 -0.20 -2.78 0.66 0.86 1.33 6.54 1.38 0.61 7.46 3.13
2003/04 0.74 -0.40 7.94 2.84 -0.38 -2.16 0.68 2.99 2.75 5.68 3.47 0.08 15.82 3.90
2004/05 9.19 0.39 3.93 2.97 -0.29 1.77 0.52 1.56 2.97 8.21 4.02 2.90 5.54 9.36
2005/06 -2.64 -0.62 0.35 1.98 2.70 -0.37 1.47 3.74 8.07 5.94 2.42 5.83 -3.44 12.22
2006/07 1.19 -5.11 0.68 -1.68 3.64 0.61 2.85 1.95 7.25 5.10 1.10 3.47 9.80 11.79
2007/08
Table 1:  Expenditure Forecasts and Outcomes
Sources:  Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents; public accounts; authors’ calculations.small mean error would result if all the errors were small or if all the errors
were large, but the overestimates and underestimates happened to balance
each other out.
￿ Accuracy. The accuracy of a forecast can be measured by how close the
values are to the actual outcomes. Measures of accuracy more clearly
reflect the usual meaning of forecast quality than the mean error, because
overestimates and underestimates do not offset each other. We show the
root mean square error — the square root of the average of the squared
forecast errors (the same formula used in calculating standard deviations).
This measure shows the size of errors without regard to whether they are
positive or negative, and gives greater weight to larger errors — a
reasonable approach, since larger overshoots and undershoots
disproportionately effect accountability.
These summary measures of the decade-long performance of Ottawa, the
provinces and the territories appear in Table 2. Quebec scores impressively by
both measures. New Brunswick and Ontario also perform relatively well when
judged by both measures. Newfoundland and Labrador is a special case. The
province performs well on bias — with years of underspending largely offsetting
years of overspending — but poorly on accuracy, like other commodity-based and
transfer-dependent jurisdictions.
Though overshoots and undershoots in revenue are less salient than those in
spending — and varying degrees of reliance on cyclical or other volatile revenue
sources complicate the cross-jurisdiction comparison — a look at the revenue side
helps our understanding of the fiscal targeting task. Tables 3 and 4 present the
same measures for revenue. Ordered by relative performance over a 10-year
period, the jurisdictions tend to fall into similar categories as they did in regard to
spending.
Examining the projected and actual results for spending and revenue
alongside each other allows a quick judgement about a commonly remarked
problem: that “surprises” in revenue and spending tend to occur together,
presumably because governments slash or splurge when revenues come in below
or above projections. 
Table 5 presents a summary statistic that sheds light on this issue — the
correlation between surprises in revenues and in spending in the same year for
each government. These correlations are generally what one would expect.
Spending overruns and undershoots tend to coincide with years of unexpected
revenue overruns and undershoots. The jurisdictions where spending under- and
overshoots correspond most closely to those in revenue are Quebec, Ontario and
Alberta, where the tendency of an unanticipated change in revenue of, say, one
percent coincides with an unanticipated change in spending of 0.9, 0.8 and 0.8
percent, respectively. With the exception of New Brunswick, all provinces — even
those with good scores in terms of bias and accuracy — seemed to struggle to
resist the urge spend up or down along with changes in revenues. As for revenue
surprises, 109 of the 136 annual differences between budgeted and actual revenue
shown in Table 3 — more than 80 percent — were overshoots. Given the
prevalence of positive revenue surprises, the story here is, in fact, largely one of
in-year spending of unanticipated revenue.
4 C.D. Howe Institute BackgrounderAre Things Getting Better, or Worse?
In this second instalment of the C.D. Howe Institute’s fiscal accountability
rankings, we use similar measures to those in our first analysis last year (Adrian,
Guillemette and Robson 2007).
2 In particular, we highlight decade-long measures
to reduce the impact of particular governments or economic episodes on the
results. The 2008 version drops 1996/97 and adds the most recent complete year,
2006/07.
Do our measures suggest that fiscal accountability in Canada is improving? We
comment here on results in the most recent year and how moving the window of
observation forward one year affects the relative performance of various
governments. In 2006/07, Newfoundland and Labrador had spending and
revenues well below those projected. The negative spending surprise offset much
of the upward bias in the province’s spending over the previous nine years —
moving it past Quebec into top spot for expenditure bias — but lowered its score
in terms of accuracy.








Federal 1.74 4 3.84 7 28,657
Nfld. 0.52 1 4.71 10 147
P.E.I. 4.30 11 5.21 11 390
NS. 2.20 6 2.87 4 1,086
NB 1.64 3 2.56 3 836
Que. 0.79 2 2.24 1 3,267
Ont. 1.90 5 2.37 2 12,272
Man. 3.15 9 3.88 8 2,005
Sask. 3.49 10 4.50 9 2,251
Alta. 5.30 12 6.07 12 10,499
B.C. 2.43 7 3.03 5 6,274
NWT
a 2.68 8 3.34 6 173
YK 7.05 13 8.57 14 404
Nunavut
a 7.78 14 8.45 13 460
Table 2:  Bias and Accuracy in Budget Forecasts of Changes in Spending,
1997/98 to 2006/07
a Starting in fiscal year 2000/01.
Sources:  Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents; public accounts; authors’ calculations.
2 Last year’s report used fiscal results numbers from the Department of Finance’s Fiscal Reference
Tables for some provinces and territories for some years. This year’s version uses public accounts
data consistently throughout. This change improved scores for Nova Scotia and Yukon and also
slightly affected the scores for Prince Edward Island relative to those in our previous report. The
comparisons between 10-year measures discussed here use the public accounts numbers.6 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
Federal Nfld. P.E.I. NS NB Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. BC NWT YK Nunavut
Announced Revenue Change (%)
1997/98 1.70 -1.61 -5.15 -0.26 -2.63 2.14 -1.51 -0.48 -7.45 -11.88 0.39 -2.96
1998/99 2.37 1.60 -1.50 -1.29 -0.17 4.28 2.46 -0.04 3.63 -11.29 1.14 -3.71
1999/00 0.13 -1.23 -2.88 1.59 1.88 -1.20 6.00 1.76 -0.51 1.56 -0.34 -7.38
2000/01 1.25 3.93 -1.66 0.23 -1.49 2.75 -0.66 1.28 9.82 -1.65 0.54 4.89 1.68 3.13
2001/02 -4.09 5.72 0.65 1.80 4.44 0.46 -1.01 0.57 -11.07 -10.71 2.31 1.61 0.91 5.46
2002/03 0.35 0.72 -0.39 3.09 1.19 2.02 4.85 0.60 2.29 -5.56 -3.57 -13.10 -2.36 -2.55
2003/04 3.36 1.82 4.58 3.78 4.40 4.26 7.79 4.64 -2.76 -2.87 4.10 10.34 1.14 10.43
2004/05 3.37 -3.81 3.07 4.16 4.58 3.13 14.81 4.01 1.79 -9.42 3.19 6.88 2.11 2.67
2005/06 2.34 3.54 3.14 4.39 2.85 3.27 5.90 -0.33 -9.17 -4.89 1.07 1.93 4.96 5.42
2006/07 2.82 0.02 3.15 5.13 0.13 4.42 2.13 3.42 -3.48 -6.34 -0.34 2.03 1.12 2.47
2007/08 1.89 15.79 8.03 6.07 2.84 1.30 2.65 5.81 -6.20 -4.66 -1.71 4.32 -3.29 2.92
Actual Revenue Change (%)
1997/98 8.77 8.93 -1.50 4.73 -0.25 4.17 6.18 6.31 -6.22 6.29 0.38 2.60
1998/99 2.16 -4.09 8.98 3.80 0.61 11.88 6.27 4.03 8.56 -5.45 0.45 13.22
1999/00 6.74 -0.62 5.51 5.14 7.48 1.64 13.02 7.62 4.53 19.76 7.61 -5.65
2000/01 8.96 6.82 4.51 6.42 1.28 7.75 2.80 6.54 15.43 28.00 10.38 22.06 13.74 10.82
2001/02 -3.29 -1.33 4.22 1.02 7.72 -1.44 -1.23 -0.09 -10.23 -14.06 -5.50 10.47 -4.52 -5.19
2002/03 3.78 2.52 -2.78 0.96 -1.30 -1.02 3.72 3.25 6.68 3.48 -3.27 -11.37 6.46 10.33
2003/04 4.65 2.92 5.29 7.16 4.14 2.78 -0.74 4.72 1.58 14.29 8.09 2.97 11.96 6.04
2004/05 7.24 2.07 9.48 9.40 9.43 4.52 13.83 11.53 19.06 13.58 14.15 13.14 11.98 10.07
2005/06 5.24 18.90 5.04 6.97 5.78 3.94 8.28 2.30 5.52 21.98 7.90 11.37 9.36 10.95
2006/07 6.23 -3.15 5.40 5.73 5.24 8.28 7.35 6.07 5.31 7.72 7.13 8.74 5.52 21.61
2007/08
Difference (%)
1997/98 7.08 10.54 3.66 4.99 2.38 2.03 7.69 6.79 1.23 18.17 -0.01 5.56
1998/99 -0.22 -5.69 10.48 5.10 0.78 7.60 3.82 4.07 4.93 5.84 -0.70 16.93
1999/00 6.61 0.61 8.40 3.54 5.61 2.84 7.03 5.86 5.04 18.20 7.96 1.73
2000/01 7.71 2.89 6.17 6.19 2.77 5.00 3.46 5.26 5.62 29.64 9.84 17.17 12.06 7.69
2001/02 0.79 -7.06 3.57 -0.78 3.27 -1.89 -0.21 -0.66 0.84 -3.35 -7.81 8.86 -5.43 -10.65
2002/03 3.44 1.80 -2.39 -2.13 -2.49 -3.04 -1.14 2.65 4.39 9.04 0.30 1.73 8.82 12.88
2003/04 1.30 1.10 0.71 3.38 -0.26 -1.48 -8.53 0.09 4.33 17.15 3.99 -7.36 10.81 -4.39
2004/05 3.87 5.88 6.41 5.25 4.85 1.39 -0.98 7.51 17.27 23.00 10.96 6.25 9.87 7.40
2005/06 2.90 15.36 1.89 2.59 2.93 0.67 2.38 2.63 14.69 26.87 6.83 9.44 4.40 5.53
2006/07 3.41 -3.18 2.26 0.60 5.11 3.86 5.22 2.65 8.79 14.05 7.47 6.71 4.39 19.14
2007/08
Table 3:  Revenue Forecasts and Outcomes
Sources:  Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents; public accounts; authors’ calculations.Meanwhile, 2006/07 was a poor year for Alberta and Saskatchewan in terms of
spending and revenues — worse in both cases than the 1996/97 year that dropped
out of the window. Although they occupy nearly the same positions as in last
year’s rankings, their numerical scores deteriorated.
3
We also present our summary statistics of bias, accuracy and correlation for the
most recent five-year period and contrast those results with the performance of the
various governments in the previous five years to give a sense of whether things
got better or worse during the decade (Table 6). Overall, in the most recent five-
year period, the results are positive: more governments scored better on both the








Federal 3.69 7 4.50 4 61,849
Nfld. 2.23 3 6.98 9 890
P.E.I. 4.12 9 5.48 7 367
NS 2.87 5 3.91 3 1,406
NB 2.49 4 3.47 1 1,326
Que. 1.70 1 3.57 2 7,429
Ont. 1.87 2 4.93 6 10,806
Man. 3.68 6 4.50 5 2,405
Sask. 6.71 12 8.44 10 4,482
Alta 15.86 14 18.47 14 36,032
B.C. 3.88 8 6.78 8 10,875
NWT
a 6.11 11 9.29 12 377
YK 6.91 13 9.09 11 375
Nunavut
a 5.37 10 10.75 13 350
a Starting in fiscal year 2000/01.
Sources:  Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents; public accounts; authors’ calculations.
Federal Nfld. P.E.I. NS NB Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. NWT YK Nunavut
Correlation
of surprises*
0.30 0.53 0.54 0.29 0.16 0.88 0.79 0.54 0.46 0.80 0.42 0.45 0.35 0.37
Rank 3 9 10 2 1 14 12 11 8 13 6 7 4 5
* A two-tailed test at a 10 percent significance level and eight degrees of freedom yields a critical value of 0.549. Thus, many of
the coefficients fail ordinary significance tests.
Sources:  Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents; public accounts; authors’ calculations.
Table 5:  Correlation of Surprises
Table 4:  Bias and Accuracy in Budget Forecasts of Changes in Revenue,
1997/98 to 2006/07
3 Although New Brunswick struggled in 2006/07, this was largely offset by an equally poor year
that was dropped from its record. Contrarily, Prince Edward Island had a decent 2006/07, but
lost another good year from its record. bias and accuracy measures than scored worse.
4 Specifically, for both expenditures
and revenues, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec
appear to be making strides in following through on their budget numbers in
terms of bias and accuracy.
Unfortunately, however, not all jurisdictions are making progress. On the
expenditure side in recent years, Saskatchewan, Alberta, Nunavut and Ottawa
struggled more to follow through on their promises than in the earlier period. And
on the revenue side — not surprisingly in view of the recent strength of
commodity prices — those who have shown a declining performance over time
tend to be commodity-based jurisdictions. When it comes to the correlations
between surprises in revenues and surprises in spending, the story is less positive:
a small majority of jurisdictions seemed likelier to spend unexpected gains in
revenue in the most recent five years than in the previous five years.
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Table 6:  Trends in Accountability
Expenses
Federal Nfld. P.E.I. NS NB Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. NWT YK Nunavut
Bias:
First 5 years 1.64 1.30 5.82 3.06 2.18 2.15 2.56 4.08 2.51 4.30 2.39 2.98 7.07 7.03
Last 5 years 1.83 -0.27 2.77 1.33 1.09 -0.58 1.24 2.22 4.47 6.29 2.48 2.56 7.04 8.08
Difference 0.19 -1.57 -3.04 -1.73 -1.09 -2.74 -1.32 -1.86 1.96 1.99 0.09 -0.42 -0.04 1.06
Accuracy: 
First 5 years 3.28 5.92 6.19 3.42 3.00 2.60 2.98 4.91 3.65 5.74 3.30 2.20 7.62 4.45
Last 5 years 4.33 3.04 4.00 2.19 2.04 1.79 1.51 2.44 5.21 6.38 2.73 3.29 9.43 8.96
Difference 1.05 -2.88 -2.20 -1.24 -0.96 -0.81 -1.47 -2.47 1.56 0.64 -0.57 1.10 1.81 4.50
Revenues
Bias:
First 5 years 4.39 0.26 6.46 3.81 2.96 3.12 4.36 4.26 3.53 13.70 1.86 13.01 6.17 -1.48
Last 5 years 2.98 4.19 1.78 1.94 2.03 0.28 -0.61 3.11 9.89 18.02 5.91 3.33 7.66 8.11
Difference -1.41 3.94 -4.68 -1.87 -0.93 -2.84 -4.97 -1.16 6.36 4.32 4.05 -9.68 1.49 9.59
Accuracy:
First 5 years 5.55 6.36 6.99 4.52 3.35 4.44 5.20 5.00 4.09 17.81 6.66 8.64 9.95 5.87
Last 5 years 3.11 7.55 3.35 3.18 3.59 2.40 4.65 3.94 11.22 19.10 6.91 6.77 8.13 11.28
Difference -2.43 1.20 -3.65 -1.34 0.24 -2.04 -0.55 -0.26 0.26 1.30 0.25 -1.87 -1.82 5.41
Correlation of surprises*
First 5 Years 0.40 0.85 0.55 -0.49 -0.59 0.91 0.88 0.87 0.21 0.90 0.43 0.50 0.47 -0.05
Last 5 years 0.45 0.23 0.15 0.69 0.57 0.85 0.75 -0.42 0.42 0.28 0.48 0.87 0.58 0.38
Difference 0.05 -0.62 -0.40 1.19 1.16 -0.07 -0.13 -1.36 0.22 -0.62 0.05 0.37 0.11 0.43
* A two-tailed test at a 10 percent significance level and three degrees of freedom yields a critical value of 0.805.
Sources:  Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents; public accounts; authors’ calculations.
4 We note, however, that the best score on the bias measure is zero: a negative bias is no better (or
worse) than a positive one.Closing Observations
Canadians should not take lightly persistent or large discrepancies between what
governments say they will do and what they actually do. The consequences of
spending beyond the boundaries that governments set for themselves are serious.
Poor budgeting practices affect the future burden of debt and level of taxation.
They can undermine a government’s fiscal policy responses to changing
conditions. A government that uses much of its excess revenues — from, say,
increases in tax revenues — to increase expenditures can exacerbate cyclical peaks
in the economy instead of dampening them. Most fundamentally, results that are
regularly very different from what legislatures vote for deprive Canadians of the
ability to control many of their governments’ most crucial actions.
When it comes to improving the ability of governments to meet their future
fiscal targets, a cautionary note is in order. Targeting the bottom line, as legislation
requiring a balanced budget would do, will not alleviate the problem. Targeting a
specific number such as zero reinforces the tendency for revenue surprises to
produce spending surprises, which undermines the ability of legislators and
voters to hold governments to account for the promises they made at budget time.
The reverse case, where spending surprises — positive or negative — prompt
in-year revenue changes in the same direction, is no more appealing. Tax increases
passed in haste are less likely to pass ordinary tests of equity and efficiency than
ones properly deliberated. Similarly, in-year or end-of-year tax rebates create none
of the rewards for work, saving and investing that reductions known in advance
would create.
In the end, the central challenge facing governments is to show more discipline
by avoiding ill-thought-out, unbudgeted splurges in spending. The challenge
confronting all Canadians is primarily a political one: raising the electoral stakes
so that governments place a higher priority on hitting the targets voted for at
budget time. One measure that can assist in this process is the provision in public
accounts documents of easily read summary tables explaining the reasons for
variations between budget projections and actual results in major areas of revenue
and spending. Ottawa and Quebec provide such tables. The effectiveness of such
measures — and the effectiveness of these fiscal accountability rankings — in
promoting better behaviour will ultimately depend on the degree to which
Canadians accept the challenge of holding their governments to account. 
Each year’s budget performance matters for economic performance and living
standards at the time, and constrains the choices Canadians will make in the
future. The differing performances of Ottawa and the provinces, and changes in
the performance of each over time, show that poor accountability in general, and
spending overruns in particular, are not inevitable. If Canadians take seriously the
task of holding their governments more closely to account, future editions of these
rankings will tell a happier story.
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